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Abstract
Antitrust finds competitors’ price-fixing illegal per se. Parallel pricing among competitors
has been frequently observable in daily economic lives, and it becomes more and more so by virtue
of technological developments and globalization in the 21st century. The question is whether the
evidence tells us unlawful price-fixing is occurring. Indeed, it is one of the most challenging
questions in antitrust jurisprudence, requiring tight legal standards for deriving conspiratorial
price-fixing from the evidence. This article addresses Korean and the U.S. antitrust approaches to
this issue by identifying and evaluating their legal devices and reasoning processes in light of
relevant comparable cases of the two antitrust authorities. It argues that more practical use of
legal devices is necessary to the extent that parallel pricing phenomenon may be consistent with a
legitimate explanation as with a collusive explanation. This article concludes that since
procedural devices may functionally minimize mistaken conclusions based on ambiguous
evidence, they should be carefully employed along with reasoned analysis for competitive harm.
I. The Conceptual Foundation for Fundamentals
Parts I and II pinpoint and evaluate the functions and operations of the
legal devices of Korea and the U.S. antitrust. In search of the judicial
approaches to parallel pricing cases, this article compares and appraises the
common and different evidentiary standards of proof in Korea and the U.S. so
as to find out whether similar or differing approaches may result in different
outcomes.1) Part I generally examines how antitrust laws of Korea and the U.S.
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1) This article does not intend to substantially discuss, however, the historical devel-
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have laid the substantive foundations to find an illegal price-fixing from
circumstantial evidence. We will see that the antitrust tribunals of the two
countries have ended up with establishing expansive substantive criteria and
strict remedial measures.
1. The Substantive Rules and Remedial Measures
In the U.S. antitrust, price-fixing conduct is illegal per se and therefore
actual proof of any restraint on competition is not required.2) The following
finding by the U.S. Supreme Court suitably explains why price-fixing is
deemed illegal as a matter of law:3)
The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is
the elimination of one form of competition. The power to fix prices,
whether reasonably exercised or not, involves power to control the
market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices. Agreements
which create such potential power may well be held to be in
themselves unreasonable or unlawful restraints, without the necessity
of minute inquiry whether a particular price is reasonable or
unreasonable as fixed and without placing on the government in
enforcing the Sherman Law the burden of ascertaining from day to day
whether it has become unreasonable through the mere variation of
economic conditions.
That very reason equally holds true for Korean antitrust, which statutorily
finds price-fixing unlawful in and of itself.4) Under the MONOPOLY
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opments of the relevant antitrust rules and policy of Korea and the U.S. antitrust because related
issues thereof are too broad to be handled in short.
2) See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise, Chapter 6, at 125-49 (2008).
3) See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927). As a rigid per se
rule of price fixing, the U.S. Supreme Court found that “[u]nder the Sherman Act a combination
formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing
the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se.” See United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
4) See HANGUK GONGJEONGGEORAEWIWONHOE [KOREA FAIR TRADE COMMISSION], HANGUK
GONGJEONGGEORAEWIWONHOE 20 NYEONSA YEONGU [THE 20 YEARS’ HISTORY OF KOREA FAIR TRADE
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REGULATION AND FAIR TRADE ACT as amended on March 22, 2010
(“MRFTA”), Article 19(1) titled “Prohibition of Unfair Collaborative Acts”
contains a nonexclusive list of specific types of prohibited anticompetitive
agreements and practices.5) Article 19(1)-1 provides that “(1) [n]o firm shall
agree, or cause certain firms to agree, with other firms by contract, accord,
resolution, or any other means to jointly engage in an act, falling under any of
the following subparagraphs, that unfairly limits competition: 1. an act of
fixing, maintaining, or changing prices.”6)
Agreement is the gist of collusion action under both countries’ antitrust
laws.7) The collusion regulatory rules of the two countries are not meant to
prohibit independent action by a single firm.8) In practice, plaintiff must
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COMMISSION] (2001); see generally OHSEUNG KWAN, GYEONGJEBEOP [ECONOMIC LAWS], Chapter 6
(2002).
5) Article 19(1) was amended for a couple of purposes of establishing a per se illegality for
naked, hard-core cartels that have clearly harmful effect on competition and widening an
antitrust screen for other various collaborative acts that may have pro-competitive effect on
competition (e.g., research and development works, strategic alliances).
6) See Chapter 4 Article 19(1) of the MRFTA [DOKJEOMGYUJE MIT GONGJEONGGEORAEE
GWANHAN BEOPRYUL] as amended on March 22, 2010. The 1992 amendment of the MRFTA had
made it clear that mere agreement is what the law prohibits. See Judgment of Feb. 23, 1999,
98Du15849 (Supreme Court of Korea), in re Collusion of Kuk-Je Land & Construction Corp.
7) It has been generally understood that the U.S. antitrust stems from the common law of
contracts, in which offer, acceptance, and consideration are necessary elements for a valid
contract to exist. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY AND
PROCEDURE, 18-43 (1994). Antitrust understandings for conscious parallelism still revolve around
the notion of agreement in the contract law sense. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Book Review, The
Rationalization of Antitrust, 116 Harv. L. Rev 917, 921-23 (2003). Korea, as a civil law country, can
stay out of the conceptual complications and therefore directly encloses the notion of agreement
in Article 19(5) without any reserve. See SOO-IL SON, GONGDONGHANGWIEU GYUJEWA
CHUJEONGJOHANGEU MUNJEJEOM, GYEONGJEBEOPEU JEMUNJE [REGULATION OF CONCERTED ACTION
(CARTEL) AND PROBLEMS OF PRESUMPTION CLAUSE], Chapter 5, at 375 (2000).
8) See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (finding that
“[t]he conduct of a single firm is governed by [Section] 2 [of the Sherman Act] alone … Section 1
of the Sherman Act, in contrast, reaches unreasonable restraints of trade … by separate entities.”).
Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides in part that “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony.” 15 U.S.C. § 2. Likewise, in Korean antitrust, the MRFTA Article 3-2
covers a single firm’s abuse of market-dominant position, which provides in relevant part that
“(1) No market-dominating enterpriser shall commit acts that fall under any of the following
subparagraphs: 1. an act of determining, maintaining, or changing unreasonably the price of 
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establish that two or more firms agreed to coordinate their conduct in a certain
manner. In Korean antitrust, however, agreement as literally translated into
Korean means a meeting of the minds among competitors, which may include
conduct not rising to the level of a contract, combination, or conspiracy as
understood under Section 1 of the U.S. Sherman Act.9)
Under both the U.S. and Korean antitrust laws, conspirators found to fix
prices are subject to monetary fines and/or criminal imprisonment. The U.S.
Sherman Act Section 1 provides in relevant part that: “[e]very person who
shall [be in violation of Section 1] … shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and,
on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a
corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not
exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the
court.”10) To obtain a monetary relief under Sections 4 and 4A of the Clayton
Act, a Sherman Section 1 private plaintiff must show an injury in the plaintiff’s
business or property as a result of the conspiracy.11)
Article 21 of the MRFTA provides that “[w]here there is one of unfair
collaborative acts that violate the provisions of Article 19, the [KFTC] may
order for concerted firms to discontinue the act, publicly announce that it has
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goods or services.” Unlike Korean and the U.S. antitrust, however, Article 82 of EUROPEAN UNION
COMPETITION LAW that regulates abuse of market-dominating firms can in principle reach
oligopoly pricing as it prohibits one or more undertakings’ conduct. The so-called collective
dominant position theory enables Article 82 to do that. Compare Erhard Kantzenbach et al., New
Industrial Economics and Experiences from European Merger Control—New Lessons about Collective
Dominance?, in THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1995) with George A. Hay, Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly,
and Antitrust Law, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 439 (1982).
9) The Sherman Act Section 1 provides in relevant part that “[e]very contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” 15 U.S.C. § 1. Agreement is
called Hap-Yeo in Korean and is 合意 in Chinese. See Judgment of Feb. 13, 1996, 94Gu36751
(Seoul High Ct.), in re Request for Reversing Corrective Orders on Collusion of Five Personal
Computer Manufacturing Companies, Eleventh Special Division.
10) 15 U.S.C. § 1. The alternative maximum fine is “the greater of twice the gross gain or
twice the gross loss.” 18 U.S.C. §3571(d) (providing that “(d) Alternative Fine Based on Gain or
Loss.—If any person derives pecuniary gain from the offense, or if the offense results in
pecuniary loss to a person other than the defendant, the defendant may be fined not more than
the greater of twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss, unless imposition of a fine under this
subsection would unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process.”).
11) 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 15a.
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received corrective orders, or take other corrective measures.”12) Article 22 of
the MRFTA enables the KFTC to impose “a surcharge not exceeding an
amount equivalent to ten (10) percent of the turnover determined by the
implementing statute of Presidential Decree. In the absence of any turnover, a
surcharge may be imposed up to but not exceeding two (2) billion Won.”13)
Article 66 provides in pertinent part that any person who engages in collusive
conduct “shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than three (3) years
or a fine up to but not exceeding two (2) hundred million Won … The
punishments of imprisonment and fine … may be imposed concurrently.”14)
Unlike the U.S. antitrust, Korean antitrust’s corrective measures for price-
fixing include a public announcement that it has received corrective orders.
The public announcement measure is based upon an idea that if the
announcement is made through major daily newspapers, it will do damage to
the conspirators’ corporate reputation and images as being subject to social
opprobrium and criticism. It is thus intended to deter competitors from
engaging in collusive price-fixing. The criminal measures of the two countries
commonly purport to attach personal stigma and criminality to the
conspirators, whether corporate or individual.15)
*                             *                             *
For effective enforcement of the substantive collusion rules, civil and
criminal sanctions have increased for purposes of wiping out explicit collusion
to fix prices. However, if the competing firms merely substitute other means
of price coordination for explicit price-fixing agreement, it is likely to militate
against the sanctions’ intended result of deterrence or prevention of collusive
conduct. Furthermore, price coordination in nature may not need any sort of
formal or detailed agreement on output or the volume of sales because price
increase at a certain rate or for a certain amount can be easily agreed upon.
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12) Art. 21 of the MRFTA as amended on March 22, 2010.
13) Art. 22 of the MRFTA as amended on March 22, 2010. Two billion Won is
approximately equivalent to two million U.S. Dollars.
14) Art. 66 of the MRFTA as amended on March 22, 2010. Other corrective measures
normally are administrative warning or advice.
15) For understanding developments of the U.S. criminal enforcement programs, see
William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms, 71
ANTITRUST L. J. 377 (2003); see also Donald I. Baker, The Use of Criminal Remedies to Deter and
Punish Cartels and Bid-Rigging, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 693 (2001).
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The absence or lack of direct evidence therefore quite often precludes us from
finding price-fixing with confidence. For these reasons, the fact that concerted
price-fixing is illegal is one thing; and proof of agreement is the other because
it necessitates a satisfactory presentation of quantitative and qualitative
circumstantial evidence as the case may require.
2. The Operation of Defenses and Justifications
Both countries’ antitrust reaches out various rudimentary ways of
concerted conduct that may not amount to full-blown price-fixing. The U.S.
courts have found that “[a] knowing wink may mean more than words” and
that “”[a] gentlemen’s agreement” will do.”16) Moreover, once the agreement
to fix a price is made, it is conclusively presumed that a conspiracy to restrain
trade exists. It is “immaterial whether the agreements were ever actually
carried out, whether the purpose of the conspiracy was accomplished in
whole or in part or whether effort was made to carry the object of the conspiracy
into effect.”17) In other words, mere attempt to fix prices concertedly—as
opposed to actual performance is sufficient to be proscribed; and it does not
count as a defense that the attempt to increase prices in concert did not
succeed at the end of the day.18)
In the Korean collusion case of thirteen airline companies, the airline
companies were held liable for fixing inbound airfares. They argued that the
airfares were not actually charged to customers even if they had discussed the
fare issues at a meeting of the companies. Korea Fair Trade Commission
(Hanguk Gongjeonggeoraewiwonhoe: “KFTC”) found that the mere
agreement of defendants’ engaging in one of the listed acts under Article 19(1)
constitutes unlawful concerted acts and actual performance pursuant to the
agreement is not required.19) In Korean practice, defendants sometimes have
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16) See Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1965); see also T.R. Coleman
v. Cannon Oil Co., 849 F. Supp. 1458, 1469 (M.D.Ala. 1993).
17) See Plymouth Dealers’ Ass’n of No. Cal. v. United States, 279 F.2d 128, 132 (9th Cir.
1960), quoting United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., supra note 3, at 420 (1927). 
18) See, e.g., Re-decision 96-19 of October 15, 1996, 9608JoYi1210 (Korea Fair Trade
Commission), in re Reconsideration Request of Three Paper Manufacturing Companies.
19) Re-Judgment 98-28 of Sep. 29, 1998, 9806SimYi1009 (Korea Fair Trade Commission), in re
Reconsideration Request on Collusion of Twelve Airline Companies; Judgment 98-75 of May 19, 
06Chang-Su Choe_OK  2010.7.13 3:24 PM  페이지348   (주)anyprinting(pmac) 
argued that the parallel pricing in question is reasonable or justifiable since
they raised the prices to save themselves from the deteriorating economy, to
recover from their management failures,20) to avert the cutthroat competition,21)
or to prevent the extraordinary price competition because business situations
demanded the parallel pricing retrieve business losses.22)
Where eight electric steel manufacturers were found liable for fixing,
maintaining, and changing the prices of steel products,23) one of defendants
argued that their exchanges of price information were not intended to limit
competition, but to save themselves by improving management balance of
accounts and overcoming accumulated deficits in the steel industry.24) The
Supreme Court of Korea affirmed the lower court’s finding that assuming the
argument were true, it would be one of the extenuating circumstances for
purposes of damages but could not serve to rebut the illegality of price fixing
unless the concerted action falls under one of the justifiable acts of Article 19(2)
or is authorized pursuant to Article 58.25)
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1998, 9802GongDong0121 (Korea Fair Trade Commission), in re Collusion of Thirteen Airline
Companies.
20) Judgment of Apr. 28, 1999, 98Nu10686 and 98Nu11214 as consolidated (Seoul High Ct.),
in re Request for Reversing Corrective Orders on Collusion of Dongsuh Food Co., Ltd. and
Nestle Korea Inc.
21) Re-decision 99-21 of May 3, 1999, 9901SimIl 0014 or 0016 (Korea Fair Trade Com-
mission), in re Reconsideration Request of Three Color Steel Sheet Manufacturing Companies.
22) Re-decision 97-17 of Jun. 11, 1997, 9612JoYi1913 (Korea Fair Trade Commission), in re
Reconsideration Request of Seventeen Asphalt Sales Agents.
23) Decision 2000-86 of May 31, 2000, 2000GongDong0419 (Korea Fair Trade Commission),
in re Collusion of Eight Electric Steel Manufacturing Companies; see also Hae-Sik Park,
Budanghan Gongdonghangwieu Chujeonggwa Siljiljeok Gyeongjaengjehaneu Eumi [The Meaning of
Unfair Concerted Action and Substantially Limiting Competition], 1 ECONOMIC LAW CASE STUDY
(2004).
24) Re-Judgment 2000-48 of Oct. 17, 2000, 2000SimSam0896, 0897, 0898, 0899, 0900, 0911
(Korea Fair Trade Commission), in re Reconsideration Request for Collusion of Eight Electric
Steel Manufacturing Companies.
25) See Judgment of May 27, 2003, 2002Du4648 (Supreme Court of Korea), in re Collusion of
Eight Steel Manufacturing Companies for Electric Furnace; see also Judgment of March 26, 2002,
2000Nu15035 (Seoul High Ct.), in re Collusion of Eight Electric Steel Manufacturing Companies.
Article 19(2) of the MRFTA provides that “[t]he prohibition of [unfair collaborative acts] shall
not apply where concerted practices are authorized as satisfying the requirements determined
by the Presidential Decree and where they are conducted for the purposes listed in any of the
following subparagraphs: 1. Industry rationalization; 2. Research and technology development; 
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In Continental Baking Co. v. United States,26) the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals noted that “[t]he dividing line between justification and
explanation may well be a fine one, but for that reason those walking on it
must tread carefully.” The Court found that:27)
Any evidence of justification or reasonableness after such an
agreement has been established is properly excluded in a Sherman Act
case. A defendant cannot say ‘I have entered into a price-fixing
agreement, but the prices fixed are reasonable ones dictated by
economic pressures.’ The fact that the prices were reasonable is no
defense. Once the defendant admits the agreement he may say no
more for it is illegal per se.
In a parallel pricing case, defendants are required to come forward with
independent business justifications or defenses in order to explain away the
alleged concerted action that plaintiff seeks to establish or has established.
Defendants should counter or rebut an allegation of concerted action by
contending, for example, that the parallel pricing just reflects a normal or
independent course of pricing decisions in the oligopoly industry.28) The
pertinent question to be posed is therefore whether the external accord of
concerted action, no matter how significantly uniform or parallel, can be
adequately explained by independent business justifications.29)
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3. Overcoming economic depression; 4. Industrial restructuring; 5. Rationalization of trade
terms and conditions; or 6. Enhancement of competitiveness small and medium enterprises.”
Article 58 provides that “[the MRFTA] shall not apply to the acts of a firm or a trade association
conducted in accordance with any act or any decree to such an act.”
26) See Continental Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137, 143-44 (6th Cir. 1960); see also
Morton Salt Co. v. United States, 235 F.2d 573 (10th Cir. 1956).
27) See Continental Baking Co. 281 F.2d 137, at 143-44; cf. United States v. FMC Corp., 306 F.
Supp. 1106, 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
28) See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, 12-13 & FN 59 (5th ed.
2002).
29) See William E. Kovacic, The Identification and Proof of Horizontal Agreements under the
Antitrust Laws, in THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN, FN 103, 148, 150 (Spring 1993).
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3. The Meaning of Price and Sufficient Similarities
Although this article deals with parallel price increases, illegal price-fixing
includes price decreases or any other concerted pricing conduct as long as
competitors’ particular pricing decisions have the effect to stabilize relevant
market prices. The broad antitrust reach is predicated upon an idea that
defendants’ concerted act of price decreases has led to higher price levels than
would have prevailed without the concerted conduct and, therefore, that
collusion to decrease or stabilize prices at a certain level or rate has the same
effect as collusion to fix higher prices.
In United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., the U.S. Supreme Court has
found that “agreements to fix or maintain prices [cannot be found to be]
reasonable restraints and therefore permitted by the [Sherman Act], merely
because the prices themselves are reasonable.”30) As early as 1940, the U.S.
Supreme Court has held that stabilizing prices as well as raising them is an
unreasonable interference with the free play of the market and is unlawful per
se, noting that “in terms of market operations stabilization is one form of
manipulation.”31)
That comprehensive construction applies to Korean antitrust as well for
the same reason. In the 2001 collusion case of tinplate steel manufacturers, The
Supreme Court of Korea interpreted the meaning of prices under the collusion
prohibition provision as follows:32)
The prices under Section 1 of Article 19(1) include considerations
that firms offer in exchange for products or services, which indicate a
series of economic benefits in transactions that sellers receive as
consideration from buyers. [In other words], without holding on to the
titles thereof, the prices of relevant products and services encompass
whatever sellers are actually required to provide in return for the
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30) See Trenton Potteries Co. 273 U.S., at 396-98.
31) See Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. 310 U.S., at 223; see also United States v. Container Corp. of
America, 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969); see also FMC Corp., 306 F.Supp., at 1147.
32) Judgment of Mar. 8, 2001, 2000Du10212 (Supreme Court of Korea), in re Collusion of
Tinplate Steel Manufacturing Companies. 
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products or services with reference to the characteristics of relevant
products or services, the terms and conditions of transactions.
In the collusion case of four installment financing companies, Seoul High
Court found that the parallel interest rate decreases give rise to an act that
substantially limits competition.33) There, defendants alleged that since the
change from the prior higher rates to the uniform interest rate of 25 percent
resulted in a decreased interest rate, the act has the effect to promote
competition as opposed to limit competition. The Court held that the
defendants have lowered the installment interest rates in concert in order to
safely maintain their business profits and to avoid further competitive
decreases of installment interest rates. It reasoned that appreciable interest rate
decreases for installment purposes were expected in response to the
considerably reduced market-wide interest rates on which the defendants had
relied in raising funds from other financing companies.
To be sure courts generally have demanded more than the price uniformity
or parallelism, but it has been questioned many times whether the price
increases themselves can operate as one of so-called plus factors to support an
inference of collusive price fixing. As a practical matter, the inquiry requires
evaluation of the degree of persuasiveness in view of the “incredible”
identities of parallel pricing.34) In Korean antitrust, an external accord of
parallelism in prices is not only one of the factors plaintiff must establish but
also may strengthen, if found to be significantly uniform, the existence of
concerted action.35)
Similarly, the U.S. antitrust appears to find parallel pricing as a relevant
plus factor. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “[i]t is also true it
‘has never (been) held that proof of parallel business behavior conclusively
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33) Judgment of Apr. 18, 2002, 2001Nu2579 (Seoul High Ct.), in re Request for Reversing
Corrective Orders on Collusion of Four Installment Financing Companies. 
34) See Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust
Principles and Their Application, paragraphs 1425C & 1434B (2nd ed. 2000).
35) See, e.g., Judgment 2002-098 of May 17, 2002, 2002YuGerl0457 (Korea Fair Trade
Commission), in re Collusion of Four Credit Card Companies; see also Judgment 2001-126 of Sep.
10, 2001, 2001DokJum1934 (Korea Fair Trade Commission), in re Collusion and Fine
Recalculation of POSCO Steel Service & Sales Co., Ltd.
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establishes agreement or, phrased differently, that such behavior itself
constitutes a Sherman Act offense.’ But [the U.S. Supreme Court] and others
recognize that such behavior is another item to be weighed, and generally to
be weighed heavily, in the determination.”36) The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals has held that “when two or more competitors in [highly concentrated
markets] act separately but in parallel fashion in their pricing decisions, this
may provide probative evidence of the existence of an understanding by the
competitors to fix prices.”37) The courts have made it clear, however, that for
parallel pricing to be relevant it should be “unusually” parallel or uniform
under the circumstances.38)
In practice, plaintiffs occasionally set forth the evidence that defendants
have increased prices at similar times within similar price increase ranges
even though the times and ranges are not exactly the same. In such cases,
some or all of defendants contend that they should not be deemed to have
participated in the alleged collusion plan because of the differences in the
times of participation and in price increase ranges among the collusion
participants. In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., the U.S. Supreme
Court has found that “[it is not] important that the prices paid by the com-
bination were not fixed in the sense that they were uniform and inflexible.”39)
Hardly could this article find parallel pricing cases in the lower U.S. courts
where this issue has arisen, however. It may be that the closeness in times and
pricing ranges do not so much matter because unlawful price-fixing has been
quite broadly construed in the U.S. jurisprudence.40)
In Korean antitrust, the similarities or differences often have been alleged
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36) See Morton Salt Co. 235 F.2d, at 577, citing Theatre Entreprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film
Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954); see also In re Citric Acid Litigation, 191 F.3d 1090,
1102 (9th Cir. 1999), quoting In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products
Antitrust Litigation, 906 F.2d 432, at 441-60 (9th Cir. 1990); T.R. Coleman, 849 F.Supp., 1466.
37) See in re Baby Food Antitrust Litigation, 166 F.3d 112, 122 (3rd Cir. 1999); see also Federal
Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 715 (1948); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v.
United States, 260 F.2d 397, 400 (4th Cir. 1958).
38) See T.R. Coleman, 849 F. Supp., at 1467; see also in re Baby Food Antitrust Litigation, supra
note 37, at 135; Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, N.A., 815 F.2d 522, 525-26 (9th Cir.
1987).
39) See Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S., at 223.
40) See Lawrence A. Sullivan, The Viability of the Current Law on Horizontal Restraints, 75 CAL.
L. REV. 835, 863 & FN 118 (1987).
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and contested in practice. In the collusion case of thirty two banking
companies where the defendants were held liable for fixing interest rates, the
KFTC deemed a couple of alleged participants not to have engaged in the
interest rate maintenance scheme because they increased the rates in 15 to 30
days after others had increased them.41) After this case has been decided,
defendants time and again raised the question as part of their defenses.
Korean antitrust tribunals generally have found that minor deviations in the
times of price increases do not undermine an illegality of price-fixing. For
example, in the collusion case of seventeen asphalt sales agents, the KFTC has
found that although one of the defendants matched the prices one month after
other defendants had raised prices, it does not disturb a finding of the
concerted price fixing.42) Whenever this question was raised, the KFTC has
reasoned as follows:43)
The scope of agreement under the collusion prohibition clause
includes cases not only where defendants change prices at the same
time but also various types of agreements where price changes cannot
be deemed to have resulted from free price changes pursuant to
individual firm’s independent decision-making, such as where
defendants change prices successively within certain intervals during
the price changing periods or where defendants determine prices in
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41) Judgment 93-27 of Apr. 20, 1993, 9303Dan173 (Korea Fair Trade Commission), in re
Collusion of 32 banking companies including Je-Il Bank.
42) Re-Judgment 97-17 of Jun. 11, 1997, 9612JoYi 1913 (Korea Fair Trade Commission), in re
Reconsideration Request of Sixteen Asphalt Sales Agents; Re-decision 98-39 of Nov. 6, 1998,
9809SimYi1400 or 1401 (Korea Fair Trade Commission), in re Reconsideration Request of
DaeHan Cast-Iron Product Manufacturing Corp. and LightTech Industry Corp.; Re-decision 99-
21 of May 3, 1999, 9901SimIl 0014 or 0016 (Korea Fair Trade Commission), in re Reconsideration
Request of Three Color Steel Sheet Manufacturing Companies.; Re-Judgment 98-21 of Aug. 19,
1998, 9806SimYi1011 (Korea Fair Trade Commission), in re Reconsideration Request of Three
LPG Container Valve Manufacturing Companies.
43) See, e.g., Judgment of Jul. 29, 1998, 9805SimYi0735 (Korea Fair Trade Commission),  in re
Reconsideration Request of Four Sanitary Paper Manufacturing Companies; see also Re-
Judgment 2001-055 of Nov. 3, 2001, 2001SimIl2010 (Korea Fair Trade Commission), in re
Reconsideration Request of Eleven Property Insurance Companies; Re-Judgment 2001-04 of Jan.
17, 2001, 2000SimYi1267 (Korea Fair Trade Commission), in re Reconsideration Request of Four
Installment Financing Companies.
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different ways or establish maximum prices, minimum prices, or
average prices by differentiating changes in prices.
A notable technical question here is to what extent differences in increased
price or rate amount are permissible. In the collusion case of seven cement
manufacturers, the KFTC found that although the differences in price increase
rates among defendants amount to 1.4 percent (increases from 13.4 to 14.8
percent), they are deemed to substantially have merged into a point of 14
percent increase on the average and therefore may well constitute an external
accord of concerted action.44) In the 2002 collusion case of four credit card
enterprisers, there was evidence that although the transaction rates have
increased, the exact amount of the increases are all different among defendants
(a difference in about 1 percent rate), and that there is more than one month
gap in time between the first and the last rate increase moves.45)
The credit card enterprisers argued that there are no simultaneous, parallel
rate increases within the meaning of the collusion regulation clause because
there exist substantial differences in ranges and times of the transaction rate
increases. Upon appeal, Seoul High Court found in 2004 that the differences
do not preclude a finding of collusive price-fixing.46) The Court held that the
rate increases constitute a sufficient external accord of concerted action,
reasoning that because the extent of differences is not enough to affect
consumers’ decision to choose or change a credit card company, it can be seen
as economically the same rate increases. In 2006, The Supreme Court of Korea
affirmed the judgment of Seoul High Court.47)
Recently, an interesting factual question has been raised before the
Supreme Court of Korea with respect to the collusion case of ten (10)
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44) Re-Judgment 99-23 of May 4, 1999, 9902SimYi0247 (Korea Fair Trade Commission), in re
Reconsideration Request of Seven Cement Manufacturing Companies.
45) Re-Judgment 2002-029 of Sep. 9, 2002, 2002SimIl0814 (Korea Fair Trade Commission),  in
re Reconsideration Request of Four Credit Card Enterprisers.
46) Judgment of Feb. 3, 2004, 2002Nu17295 (Seoul High Ct.), in re Request for Reversing
Corrective Orders on Collusion of Four Credit Card Companies; Judgment of May 27, 2004,
2002Nu17073 (unpublished) (Seoul High Ct.), in re Request for Reversing Corrective Orders on
Collusion of Four Credit Card Companies.
47) Judgment of Oct. 12, 2006, 2004Du9371 (Supreme Court of Korea), in re Request for
Reversing Corrective Orders on Collusion of Four Credit Card Companies.
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construction companies for sales of apartment houses within the Dongbak
residential development district.48) The facts showed that the sales prices in
certain land measure offered by the ten companies were divergent among
themselves ranging from 6,704,000 Won up to 7,611,000 Won. In 2009, Korean
Supreme Court held that it should be difficult to assert the existence of an
external accord of acts simply from the facts.
The review of cases indicates that under modern Korean antitrust,
collusive parallel pricing does never call for the same amount of price
increases within the same time frames. A complaint for collusion in parallel
pricing is likely to be found valid whenever the prices have been reached by
the substantially similar amount within substantially close time frames.
Unless the facts require otherwise, the KFTC and Korean courts seem willing
to extend the allowable degrees in parallel pricing cases. On the whole, both
countries’ antitrust is highly expansive.
II. The Underlying Procedural Devices
Having discussed the substantive laws and practice of Korean and the U.S.
antitrust, Part II addresses the following question: “how and to what extent
has antitrust employed its procedural devices that tailor economic analysis to
account for the competitive benefits and hazards of business phenomena?”
Although Korean and the U.S. antitrust authorities and courts have broadly
construed the meaning of agreement, it has been difficult to answer the
question of whether in hindsight competitors’ parallel price increases were
from the invisible hands of the market or from the invisible price-fixing.49)
Antitrust must consider the probative value of large amounts of conflicting
evidence and apply thereto certain practical procedural standards that are not
specified in antitrust statutes.
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48) Judgment of Apr. 9, 2009, 2007Du6892 (Supreme Court of Korea), in re Request for
Reversing Corrective Orders on Collusion of Ten Construction Companies for Sales of
Apartment Houses within Yongin City Dongbaek Residential Development District.
49) See Inkwan Lee, Damhape Gwanhan Gyeongjehakjeok Geomto [Economic Review of Collusion],
FAIR TRADE LAW STUDY IV, Chapter 19 Fair Trade and Legal Principles, at 576-97 ( 2004).
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Establishing and employing adequate procedural devices is crucial to
countering the hazards of excessive deterrence to which the broad substantive
rules may give rise. Antitrust jurisprudence has been developing procedural
mechanism, as set up and adjusted by courts in the U.S. antitrust as a common
law country, and by legislation and sometimes by the KFTC or courts in
Korean antitrust as a civil law country.50) Part II analyzes and compares the
procedural devices of the two countries, which revolve around the three
related legal questions: what evidence is sufficient to show the existence of
concerted conduct?; which party (plaintiff or defendants) has the burden of
proof or persuasion?; and what presumptions are employed in this regard?
1. Development of the Standards of Review
The U.S. Supreme Court has rather broadly formulated the relevant
standard of review in drawing the inferences of concerted action from
circumstantial evidence. In American Tobacco Co. v. United States, the U.S.
Supreme Court had held that “where the circumstances are such as to warrant
a jury in finding that conspirators had a unity of purpose or a common design
and understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement, the
conclusion that a conspiracy is established is justified.”51) In Theatre
Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., the U.S. Supreme
Court restricted the broad reach of its prior holding, however, finding that
“[c]ircumstantial evidence of consciously parallel behavior may have made
heavy inroads into the traditional judicial attitude toward conspiracy; but
“conscious parallelism” has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act
entirely.”52) Through the mid-1980s, lower courts had followed the general
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50) See CHANMOO HUR, GONGJEONGGEORAEBEOPGWA CARTELGYUJE [ANTITRUST LAW AND CARTEL
REGULATION] (2000).
51) See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809-10 (1946).
52) See Theatre Entreprises, Inc., 346 U.S., at 541. For the cases in which the U.S. Supreme
Court had formulated relevant standards in different ways and terms, see Interstate Circuit v.
United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939) (holding that “[a]cceptance by competitors, without
previous agreement, of an invitation to participate in a plan, the necessary consequence of
which, if carried out, is restraint of interstate commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful
conspiracy under the Sherman Act.”); see also United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. 334 U.S.
131, 142 (1948) (finding that “[i]t is not necessary to find an express agreement in order to find a 
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standard formulation.53)
In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., the U.S.
Supreme Court established in 1986 the modern standard of proof to determine
the existence of concerted action with the power of circumstantial evidence,
holding that:54)
The correct standard is that there must be evidence that tends to
exclude the possibility of independent action by the [defendants]. That
is, there must be direct or circumstantial evidence that reasonably
tends to prove that [the defendants have] a conscious commitment to a
common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective.
By way of comparison, contemporary Korean antitrust law expressly
defines the relevant standard of proof where direct evidence is lacking. Article
19(5) of the MRFTA is intended to reach conscious parallelism in providing
that:55)
Where two or more firms are committing any of the acts listed in
[the Article 19(1)], they shall be presumed to have agreed to commit any
of the acts among themselves where it is highly plausible that the firms
have jointly committed the act in light of relevant circumstances, such
as the traction field or characteristics of goods and services, economic
reasons and ramifications of the acts, the times and aspects of contacts
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conspiracy. It is enough that a concerted of action is contemplated and that the defendants
conformed to the arrangement.”); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942).
53) See ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 28, at 5; see also Kovacic, supra note 29, at 24.
54) See Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 597-98 (1986);
see also Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984). Subsequently, lower
courts have adopted differing versions of the Matsushita standard. For this purpose, see
SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, at 344-45. For recent discussion of the case, Conference on
Matsushita at 20: Proof of Conspiracy, Summary Judgment, and the Role of the Economist in Price
Fixing Litigation, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 399-512 (2007).
55) Article 19(5) of the MRFTA as amended on March 22, 2010. [Emphasis added]. The U.S.
Supreme Court has defined conscious parallelism as “the process, not in itself unlawful, by
which firms in a concentrated market might in effect share monopoly power, setting their prices
at a profit maximizing, supra-competitive level by recognizing their shared economic interests
and their interdependence with respect to price and output decisions.”  
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among the firms.
Before Article 19(5) was amended in 2007, it provided that “[w]here two or
more firms are committing any acts listed in [the Article 19(1)] that
substantially limit competition in a relevant market, they shall be presumed to
have committed an unfair collaborative act despite the absence of an express
agreement to engage in such an act.” In practice, however, the post-amendment
clause and the pre-amendment clause do not seem to make any difference
with respect to the evidentiary proof of collusion.56) Therefore, the higher
courts’ findings rendered before the amendment remain effective as a matter
of law.
With the pre-amendment clause, it has been contested that the provision
may give a highly strong tool to the KFTC by allowing an illegal agreement to
be presumed simply with certain uniform or parallel acts among competitors.57)
In practice, however, both the KFTC and Seoul High Court have found that
parallel price increases among competitors alone are not enough to establish
unlawful price fixing under Article 19(5), requiring the so-called plus facts as
additional evidence.58) Indeed price parallelism and some additional evidence
have been customarily submitted and required. For that reason, there has
been a serious gap between the seemingly arbitrary standard of Article 19(5)
and the evidentiary requirements in practice. It has become necessary to
interpret the presumption clause to adequately decide conscious parallelism
cases.59)
In re Dongsuh and Nestle Korea collusion case, Korean Supreme Court
clarified the import of Article 19(5) by finding that:60)
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56) See Hoyoung Lee, 2008 Gongdonghangwigwalleon Pallyeeu Donghyang [Trends of Collusion
Related Cases of 2008], 19 JOURNAL OF KOREAN COMPETITION LAW (May 2009).
57) See SON, supra note 7; see also SUNGYUN YOON, BUDANGHAN GONGDONGHANGWIEU
CHUJEONGJOHANG, JAYUGYEONGJAENGGWA GONGJEONGGEORAE [THE PRESUMPTION CLAUSE OF UNFAIR
COLLABORATIVE ACTS, FREE COMPETITION AND FAIR TRANSACTIONS], Chapter 6 (2002).
58) See OHSEUNG KWAN ET EL., GONGJEONGGEORAEBEOP SIMGYEOLLYE 100 SEON [100 CASES IN
FINDINGS OF THE FAIR TRADE COMMISSION] (1996).
59) Cf. Sungmoo Jung, Dokjeomgyujebeopsang Chujeongjohange Gwanhan Yeongu [A Study of
Presumption Clause under Monopoly Regulation Law], at 87-109, LL. M. Dissertation (Seoul
National University, 2003).
60) Judgment of March 15, 2002, 99Du6514 and 99 Du6512 as consolidated (Supreme Court of
Korea), in re Collusion of Dongsuh Fool Co., Ltd. and Nestle Koera Inc.
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In order to prove the unfair collaborative acts that Article 19(1)
provides, the plaintiff is required to establish above all that the act in
issue has been furthered under the express or implied agreement of the
involved firms. It is not easy to prove such an agreement because
unfair collaborative acts are in nature likely to have been done in
secret. Article 19(5) is therefore intended to ensure the effective
regulation of unfair collaborative acts.
The Court literally interpreted the clause, holding that:61)
In substitution of proving agreement among firms, Article 19(5)
requires plaintiff to prove the two elements: the fact that two or more
firms are engaged in any act that falls under each subsection of Section
19(1) (External Accord of Acts); and the fact that the act constitutes one
that substantially limits competition in a relevant market (Competition
Limiting Effect).
Recently, in the 2009 collusion case of the sales of apartment houses within
the Dongbaek residential development district,62) Korean Supreme Court
refined the above standards as follows:
In light of the intention and structure of the agreement presumption
clause for unfair collaborative activities, in determining the existence of
‘external accord of act,’ although circumstances regarding the process
and reason of how each firm has led to the price determination can be
taken into account, certain simple circumstances that might presume
an agreement or tacit understanding among firms should not be
considered.
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61) See id.
62) See Judgment of Apr. 9, 2009, 2007Du6892 (Supreme Court of Korea), in re Request for
Reversing Corrective Orders on Collusion of Ten Construction Companies for Sales of
Apartment Houses within Yongin City Dongbaek Residential Development District.
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2. The Controlling Tests in Weighing Evidence
The U.S. has several procedural rules that operate in collusion cases, of
which a couple of procedural motions are relevant to discuss as mostly
frequently used in the U.S. antitrust practice. The U.S. Supreme Court has
found that “[o]n a claim of concerted price fixing, the antitrust plaintiff must
present evidence sufficient to carry its burden of proving that there was such
an agreement.”63) As the first procedural matter, defendant may move for a
motion to dismiss for plaintiff’s “failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.”64) “To withstand a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff for a Sherman
Act conspiracy claim must allege (1) concerted action; (2) by two or more
persons; and (3) that unreasonably restrains interstate or foreign trade or
commerce.”65)
At the next procedural stage,66) defendants generally move for a summary
judgment and may be entitled to the judgment as a matter of law where it is
shown that there is no genuine issue of any material fact.67) In order to defeat
the summary judgment motion, plaintiff may not simply rely on their
pleadings but must present some evidence on every material issue for which
they will bear the burden of proof at trial.68) In collusion cases, plaintiff must
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63) See Monsanto Co. 235 F.2d, at 763.
64) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6).
65) See in re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litigation, 265 F. Supp. 2d 385, 417
(S.D.N.Y. 2003), quoting in re Nasdaq Market-Makers Antitrust Litigation, 894 F. Supp. 703, 710
(S.D.N.Y. 1995).
66) See Eliot G. Disner, Antitrust Law for Business Lawyers, QUESTIONS, ANSWERS, LAW, AND
COMMENTARY, at 13, FN 2 (2nd ed. 2003).
67) Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part that
“[summary] judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.” For
understanding the development of summary judgment standards, see John R. Heninger, The
Evolving Summary Judgment Standard for Antitrust Conspiracy Cases, 12 J. CORP. L. 503 (Spring
1987).
68) See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (finding that “each element
must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden 
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establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendants
entered into an illegal conspiracy that caused plaintiff to suffer a cognizable
injury. The U.S. Supreme Court has found the standard of proof as follows:69)
To survive a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict,
a plaintiff seeking damages for a violation of § 1 [of the Sherman Act]
must present evidence “that tends to exclude the possibility” that the
alleged conspirators acted independently.70) Respondents … in other
words, a plaintiff must show that the inference of conspiracy is
reasonable in light of the competing inference of independent action or
collusive action that could not have harmed respondents.71)
The U.S. federal courts of appeals have adjusted the general summary
judgment standard in different ways, however. Some courts have explicitly
put the applicable tests or steps before conducting analysis of facts of cases.
Others have simply noted the Matsushita court’s standard up front as the
commending summary judgment principle without setting up relevant
subtests. The difference of the federal circuits’ standards appears to lie mainly
in their approaches to the question of which party—plaintiff or defendants
bears the burden of establishing the concerted or independent nature of
parallel pricing with other plus factors. Most of U.S. federal circuits generally
overturn the initial presumption in favor of non-intervention and shifts the
burden of proof regarding concerted action onto the party alleging collusive
price-fixing.
For purposes of summary judgment analysis where collusive conduct
should be inferred from parallel behaviors, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals has recently found the three-part test that a court should apply as
362 |   Journal of Korean Law Vol. 9: 343
of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the
litigation. At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the
defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presume that general
allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.”) [internal
citations omitted]; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
69) See Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 475 U.S. 574; see also Monsanto Co., 235 F.2d 573.
70) See Monsanto Co., 235 F.2d, at 764.
71) See Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 475 U.S., at 588.
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follows:72)
(1) plaintiff must establish a pattern of parallel behavior; (2) plaintiff
must demonstrate existence of one or more plus factors that tend to
exclude possibility that alleged conspirators acted independently; and
(3) defendants may rebut inference of collusion, arising from existence
of plus factors, by presenting evidence establishing that no reasonable
factfinder could conclude that they entered into price fixing conspiracy.
Similarly, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that to establish
concerted action on the basis of consciously parallel behavior, a plaintiff must
show:  “(1) that the defendants’ behavior was parallel; (2) that the defendants
were conscious of each other’s conduct and that this awareness was an
element in their decision-making processes; and (3) certain ‘plus’ factors.”73)
The Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have commonly placed the
initial burden of proof on defendants to establish independent reasons or
justifications of parallel pricing. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has
clarified the applicable test by finding that “[w]hen the defendants establish
that their conduct is consistent with independent action, the plaintiffs are
required to come forward with evidence that tends to exclude the possibility
of independent action.”74) In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum
Antitrust Litigation, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had found that:75)
Where an antitrust plaintiff relies entirely upon circumstantial
evidence of conspiracy, a defendant will be entitled to summary
judgment if it can be shown that (1) the defendant’s conduct is consistent
with other plausible explanations and (2) permitting an inference of
conspiracy would pose a significant deterrent to beneficial procom-
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72) See Williamson Oil Co., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1301 (11th Cir. 2003).
73) See Intervest, Inc. v. Bloomberg, L.P., 340 F.3d 144, 165 (3rd Cir. 2003), quoting Petruzzi’s
IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1242-43 (3rd Cir. 1993).
74) See H.L. Hayden Co. of New York, Inc. v. Siemens Medical Sys., Inc., 879 F.2d 1005, 1014
(2nd Cir. 1989).
75) See in re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings, Petrolium Products Anitrust Litigation, 906
F.2d, at 440.
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petitive behavior. (3) Once the defendant has made such a showing,
the plaintiff must come forward with other evidence that is sufficiently
unambiguous and tends to exclude the possibility that the defendant
acted lawfully.
More recently, the Ninth Circuit articulated “a two-part test to be applied
whenever a plaintiff rests its case entirely on circumstantial evidence,”76)
finding that “the defendant can rebut an allegation of conspiracy by showing
a plausible and justifiable reason for its conduct that is consistent with proper
business practice. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to provide
specific evidence tending to show that the defendant was not acting
independently.” The Sixth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals have applied
the same two-part test by asking a couple of questions: “(1) [I]s the plaintiff’s
evidence of conspiracy ambiguous, i.e., is it as consistent with the defendants’
permissible independent interests as with an illegal conspiracy; and, if so, (2)
Is there any evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the defendants
were pursuing these independent interests.”77)
Other Circuit Courts of Appeals simply have stated either the general
summary judgment standard under the Federal Rules of Procedure78) or the
standard the U.S. Supreme Court had found, without specifying some
relevant tests for purposes of finding a concerted action by circumstantial
evidence only. For instance, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that
plaintiff failed to overcome a summary judgment motion because “it has not
provided evidence tending to exclude the possibility that [the defendants]
acted independently, or that would show that the inference of conspiracy to
fix prices is reasonable in light of the competing inference of independent
action.”79)
Korean antitrust does not have procedural rules analogous to the U.S.
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76) See in re Citric Acid Litigation, 191 F.3d, at 1094, quoting several ninth circuit cases
including Richards v. Neilsen Freight Lines, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).
77) See Wallace v. Bank of Bartlett, 55 F.3d 1166, 1167-68 (6th Cir. 1995), quoting Riverview
Investments, Inc. v. Ottawa Community Improvement Corp., 899 F.2d 474, 483 (6th Cir. 1990);
see also Gibson v. Greater Park City Co., 818 F.2d 722, 724 (10th Cir. 1987).
78) See supra note 67 and the accompanying text.
79) See Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 822 F.2d 656, 660-61 (7th Cir. 1987).
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summary judgment that enable courts to flexibly employ for purposes of
dismissing some cases and hearing others. In general, Korean courts as equity
courts are willing to allow parties to fully proffer any evidence in order to
support each of their claims and arguments.80) Similar to the required three
elements under the U.S. antitrust to withstand a motion to dismiss, Seoul
High Court has consistently held that the following three elements must be
established in order for an act to constitute one of the unfair collaborative acts
under Article 19(1):81)
(1) Two or more firms concertedly determined to engage in doing
any of the enumerated types of acts under each section of Article 19(1);
(2) They agreed to do the concerted action by contracts, accords,
resolutions, or any other means; and (3) The concerted action must
have a substantially restricting effect on competition in a relevant
market.
For purposes of the Article 19(5) presumption clause, Seoul High Court
has developed the two-step presumption analysis.82) The first step is that if
two or more firms are found to engage in the externally uniform acts that fall
under each section of Article 19(1), the existence of concerted action is
presumed even in the absence of explicit agreements. The unlawfulness is
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80) For understanding procedural operations in Korea, see DONG-WHEE LEE, DOKJEOMGYUJE
MIT GONGJEONGGEORAEAE GWANHAN BEOPRYUL [INTRODUCTION TO MONOPOLY REGUALTION AND FAIR
TRADE LAWS] (1995); see also Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise, supra note 2, at 145-48.
81) See Judgment of Apr. 18, 2002, 2001Nu2579 (Seoul High Ct.), in re Request for Reversing
Corrective Orders on Collusion of Four Installment Financing Companies; Judgment of Mar. 26,
2002, 2000Nu15035 (Seoul High Ct.), in re Request for Reversing Corrective Orders on Collusion
of Eight Steel Manufacturing Companies for Electric Furnace; Judgment of Jun. 5, 2001,
99Nu10898 (Seoul High Ct.), in re Request for Reversing Corrective Orders on Collusion of
Three Petroleum Sales Agents and LG-Caltex Refinery Corp.; Judgment of Jan. 9, 2001,
99Nu7311 (Seoul High Ct.), in re Request for Reversing Corrective Orders on Collusion of Beer
Manufacturing Companies; Judgment of Jun. 20, 2000, 98Nu10839 (Seoul High Ct.), in re Request
for Reversing Corrective Orders on Collusion of Four Sanitary Paper Manufacturing Companies.
But see Judgment of Oct. 17, 2002, 2001Nu10716 (Seoul High Ct.), in re Request for Reversing
Corrective Orders on Collusion of Eleven Property Insurance Companies .
82) This approach is similar to the approach of Donald Turner’s. See generally Donald F.
Turner, The Definition of Agreement under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to
Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962).
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then presumed when the party arguing for unlawfulness of the presumed
concerted action proves the competitive harm in a relevant market.
The firms intending to disapprove the condemnation of unfair
collaborative acts must rebut the presumptions by advancing convincing
circumstances to show that the uniform acts are not performed in concerted
fashion pursuant to the firms’ agreements. In re Collusion of Beer
Manufacturing Companies, The Supreme Court of Korea found that “[t]he
defendants who are presumed to agree on concerted action can rebut the
presumption by proving the absence of concerted action or other
circumstantial evidence that can convince one that consciously parallel
conduct does not constitute concerted action pursuant to certain
agreements.”83)
*                                     *                                     *
A cursory examination of the procedural rules of the two countries might
lead us to merely suppose that the two countries have some significant
procedural differences. Upon closer look, however, the presumption clause
Article 19(5) does fittingly play the same role as the U.S. summary judgment
standard does in the antitrust context. The presumed concerted action is
rebuttable and shifts the burden of proof to defendant: defendant must show
that in fact the presumed concerted action is independent in its nature and
extent with legitimate business reasons thereof; and plaintiff must then come
up with some evidence to rebut the independent business reasons or
justifications.
In general, both antitrust jurisdictions do not appear to have strictly
required parties to produce specific evidence in a form of burden of proof or
persuasion, but to have liberally permitted them to present arguments and
evidence to establish or rebut the existence of collusive price-fixing. The
Article 19(5) of Korean antitrust and the U.S. Second and Ninth Circuit Courts
of Appeals, however, equally place on the part of defendants the initial
burden of coming forward with business justifications or independent reasons
for price increases, and on the part of plaintiff the subsequent burden of
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83) See Judgment of Feb. 28, 2003, 2001Du1239 (Supreme Court of Korea), in re Collusion of
Beer Manufacturing Companies; see also Judgment of May 28, 2002, 2000Du1386 (Supreme
Court of Korea), in re Collusion of Four Sanitary Paper Manufacturing Companies.
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rebutting the independent reasons.
3. The Opposite Ways of Viewing Evidence
The antitrust tribunals of Korea and the U.S. generally have the same
principle that the proffered evidence including plus factors should be
weighed as a whole. The U.S. Supreme Court found that in cases involving
alleged conspiracies in violation of the Sherman Act, “[p]laintiffs should be
given the full benefit of their proof without tightly compartmentalizing the
various factual components and wiping the slate clean after scrutiny of each.
The character and effect of a conspiracy are not to be judged by dismembering
it and viewing its separate parts, but only by looking at it as a whole.”84)
Confronted with cases required to assess circumstantial evidence in
parallel pricing arrangements, most U.S. federal courts have put into a
statement of law the above Supreme Court’s directive or similar ones. For
example, the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that “[a] court
deciding whether to grant summary judgment should not view each piece of
evidence in a vacuum. Seemingly innocent or ambiguous behavior can give
rise to a reasonable inference of conspiracy in light of the background against
which the behavior takes place. Evidence can take on added meaning when
viewed in context with all the circumstances surrounding a dispute.”85)
In Korean antitrust practice, the reviewing courts as well as the KFTC
found that to infer a concerted price-fixing from parallel pricing, a court
should consider plus factors as a whole in addition to the parallel price increases
of products or services.86) The KFTC held in 2002 that it is a reasonable and
desirable analytical way to consider as a whole such factors as the market and
market power, each relevant party involved in the market for analysis of
market behaviors, the superiority and degree of power that each party
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84) See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699 (1962).
85) See Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 246, 254-55 (2nd Cir. 1987); see also Blomkest
Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028, 1049 (8th Cir. 2000) (The
dissenting opinion noted that “[t]he plaintiff’s evidence must amount to more than a scintilla,
but the plaintiff does not have to outweigh the defendant’s evidence item by item.”), quoting
Rossi v. Standard Roofing, Inc., 156 F.3d 452, 466 (3rd Cir. 1998).
86) See Decision 2001-126 of Sep. 10, 2001, 2001DokJum1934 (Korea Fair Trade Commission),
in re Collusion and Fine Recalculation of POSCO Steel Service & Sales Co., Ltd.
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possesses, the distribution structure and transaction characteristics, and
conditions in determining prices.87)
In the collusion case of eleven property insurance companies, Seoul High
Court found in 2002 that other factors have been considered as a whole,
including the characteristics and current situations of domestic automobile
insurance market, determining the structure of automobile insurance fees, the
impact that then-automobile insurance fees have had on domestic economy,
and then-economic policy background.88) In the 2003 collusion case of four
petroleum producers in the Jeju Island (an island off the southern coast of the
Korean peninsula), The Supreme Court of Korea has found that “in weighing
the circumstances that can rebut a presumed concerted action of unfair
collaborative acts, a court should reasonably consider the additional evidence
as a whole according to the general norms of business transactions.”89)
In the process of weighing plus factors, either plaintiff(s) or defendants in
Korean and the U.S. antitrust may argue for the totality of circumstances test
as the case may be. For instance, one U.S. Sherman Act Section 1 plaintiff has
contended that “several incidents which it sought to establish as evidence of
the conspiracy should not be viewed in isolation, but rather should be
considered as tiles in the mosaic of an over-all plan or conspiracy.”90) Upon
reviewing relevant cases, however, this article found out that virtually all the
courts have considered the adduced evidence on a factor-by-factor basis
instead of viewing the evidence in its entirety.
The courts appear to have held that each plus factor must be relevant and
significant in and of itself before being nested within the totality of
circumstances.91) As far as this article goes, only one U.S. court has clarified the
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87) See Judgment 2002-225 of Oct. 31, 2002, 2002DokGoan1057 (Korea Fair Trade
Commission), in re Collusion of LG-Caltex Corp. and SK Gas Corp.
88) See Judgment of Oct. 17, 2002, 2001Nu10716 (Seoul High Ct.), in re Request for Reversing
Corrective Orders on Collusion of Eleven Property Insurance Companies .
89) See Judgment of Dec. 12, 2003, 2001Du5552 (Supreme Court of Korea), in re Collusion of
Three Petroleum Manufacturing and Sales Agents and LG-Caltex Refinery Corp.; see also in re
Collusion of Eight Steel Manufacturing Companies for Electric Furnace, supra note 25.
90) See FMC Corp., 306 F. Supp., at 1135.
91) See Williamson Oil Co., Inc., 346 F.3d, at 1310 (noting that “if a benign explanation for the
action is equally or more plausible than a collusive explanation, the action cannot constitute a
plus factor. Equipoise is not enough to take the case to the jury.”).
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reason that the totality of circumstances approach should not be proper,
noting that “[b]ecause of the episodic nature of the incidents, separated in
space and time, and the disparity of their respective elements, linked only by
the cast of characters common to most of them, it is necessary to consider
some of these incidents separately to define precisely the nature of the
conspiracy.”92)
Nevertheless, it seems unwarranted to assert that precisely defining the
nature of conspiracy necessitates the use of each factor one by one. For the
opposite may be true, that is, the as a whole approach may well lead us to
draw a bigger picture of conspiracy in question. Further, it is exactly for the
purpose of adequately considering the nature of collusion that we should
have recourse to and assess plus factors to begin with. Indeed in the 2002 case
of In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation,93) Judge Posner writing
for the court noted that:
The [one of the traps] to be avoided in evaluating evidence of an
antitrust conspiracy for purposes of ruling on the defendants’ motion
for summary judgment is to suppose that if no single item of evidence
presented by the plaintiff points unequivocally to conspiracy, the
evidence as a whole cannot defeat summary judgment. It is true that
zero plus zero equals zero. But evidence can be susceptible of different
interpretations, only one of which supports the party sponsoring it,
without being wholly devoid of probative value for that party.
Otherwise what need would there ever be for a trial?
Notwithstanding the Judge Posner’s observation, both Korea and the U.S.
antitrust are likely to break the proffered evidence into separate categories for
analysis purposes, and weigh the evidence on an item-by-item basis for
assessing its relevancy and significance. If one item of evidence is found to be
irrelevant, it may not be added to the probative value in the total evidence
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92) See FMC Corp., 306 F. Supp., at 1135.
93) See in re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation, 295 F.3d 651, 656-57 (7th Cir.
2002). For understanding the implications of this decision, see David L. Meyer, The Seventh
Circuit’s High Fructose Corn Syrup Judgment—Sweet for Plaintiffs, Sticky for Defendants, ANTITRUST
(Fall 2002).
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package.
*                                   *                                   *
Having said that, the technical differences of procedural devices may well
affect antitrust practitioners and benches for counseling and litigation
purposes although the antitrust tribunals of Korea and the U.S. seem to
employ similar procedural tests. The Article 19(5) has the burden-shifting
function similar to the U.S. motion for summary judgment: Defendants bear
the initial burden to show independent business justifications of parallel
pricing while plaintiff the later burden to rebut the independent nature and
extent. The burden-shifting operation appears meaningful in that defendant
business people normally are in a better position to explain justifiable and
rational reasons of parallel pricing.
Although functionally sensible, the presumption clause remains to be a
practically dangerous procedural device. Since it might be used to require
defendants to bear the burden of showing the absence of agreement, that is,
disproving the alleged presence of concerted action, it runs the risk of adversely
affecting defendant business people. In recent Korean antitrust practice,
defendants have had on a couple of occasions to explicitly argue that the plus
factors developed in the U.S. antitrust should serve as a useful guideline when
it comes to establishing a concerted action from parallel behaviors.94)
Korean courts have rejected the argument, reasoning that Korean antirust
has the positive provision of Article 19(5) presumption clause. The KFTC has
noted that even in the presence of direct evidence it does introduce circum-
stantial evidence in order to manage the presumption system in a more
limited and rigorous manner. Indeed Korean antitrust practice has required
plaintiff to come forward with more sophisticated analysis of market
conditions and supporting arguments, being prepared to rebut defendant’s
rational, economic reasons and justifications for parallel pricing. 
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94) See in re Reconsideration Request of Sixteen Asphalt Sales Agents, supra note 42; see also
in re Request for Reversing Corrective Orders on Collusion of Four Installment Financing
Companies, supra note 33; in re Reconsideration Request of Seven Cement Manufacturing
Companies, supra note 44.
06Chang-Su Choe_OK  2010.7.13 3:24 PM  페이지370   (주)anyprinting(pmac) 
III. The Significance and Viability of Competitive Harm
In general, the U.S. antitrust has been reluctant to control oligopoly pricing
because of our inability to appreciate the existence of competitive harm, that
is, as a practical matter, we are neither in a position to nor will we be sure
whether indeed parallel pricing in hand amounts to a supra-competitive price
and therefore has harmed competition. In this regard, Professor Areeda
provides for deeper observations noting that:95)
[A few firms’ consciously parallel pricing] does not mean that
consumers will be injured, for oligopoly prices may be lower in the
long run if they reflect increased innovations and if the oligopolists are
more progressive than more numerous firms would be. Even in the
short run, the degree of concentration alone cannot tell us whether
output and prices will approach competitive or monopolistic levels in a
particular market. Considering the other market characteristics
facilitating or impeding tacit price coordination … improves our ability
to predict the likelihood or degree of noncompetitive pricing in a
market. Nevertheless, many “wild cards” remain—for example,
varying perceptions about profit maximizing price levels, differential
responses to cost advantages or disadvantages, and different
psychologies.
As discussed above, although the words of the substantially limiting effect
on competition have been deleted by virtue of the amendment in 2007, certain
quantum of competitive harm is currently required for Article 19(5) purposes.96)
Given that what counts in antitrust is the existence of harmful effect on
competition, the implications of required competitive harm have been
intensively discussed in Korean antitrust academia and practice.
Korean Antitrust for Proof of Price-Fixing   |  371No. 2: 2010
95) See Areeda and Hovenkamp, supra note 34, at para. 1429b.
96) See Lee, supra note 56, at 339-342.
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1. Korean Antitrust Practice
The acts substantially limiting competition in a relevant market are
defined under Article 2 of the MRFTA as “acts that impact or threaten to
impact the determination of price, quantity, quality, or other terms or
conditions of transactions in accordance with the intent of a firm or a trade
association, because of reduced competition in a relevant market.”97) In earlier
cases, a lack of competitive harm has been asserted as a means to arguing for a
justifiable basis of parallel pricing.98) The KFTC had merely found that the
competitive harm contains any potential effect on competition as well as any
actual effect on competition,99) and that it does not matter how much harmful
effect has been in fact had on consumers.100) This amorphous and broad
construction has persisted for a while.101)
The meaning and scope of competitive harm under Article 19(5) have been
finally up to The Supreme Court of Korea’s review.102) In the collusion case of
Dongsuh and Nestle Korea, given that the duopolists’ combined market
shares were 99 percent in the Korean market, one of the relevant issues was
whether their parallel pricing could be found to have the sufficient
competitive harm within the meaning of Article 19(5).103) The Supreme Court
of Korea in Dongsuh case first noted that the presence or absence of
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97) Article 2 also defines a relevant market as “a field that does or can have competitive
relationships by the objects, levels, or regions of transactions.”
98) The first case in which sufficiency of the competitive harm element was at issue came up
in the KFTC’s reconsideration of six publishing companies’ price-fixing case. See Judgment 90-62
of Oct. 24, 1990, 9008Dan181 (Korea Fair Trade Commission), in re Collusion of Six Publishing
Companies including Dong-A.
99) See, e.g., in re Reconsideration Request of Sixteen Asphalt Sales Agents, supra note 22.
100) See in re Reconsideration Request of Three Paper Manufacturing Companies, supra note
17.
101) For more in-depth analysis, see Myong-Jo Yang, Gongdongseongeui Ipjeunggwa
Chujeong, Gongjeonggeoraebeop Gangeui 2 [Proof and Presumption of Concerted Action], FAIR
TRADE LAW STUDY II, at 206-28 (2000).
102) See Judgment of Mar. 12, 1995, 94Nu13794 (Supreme Court of Korea), in re Collusion of
Korean Pharmaceutical Association.
103) Judgment of Apr. 28, 1999, 98Nu10686 and 98Nu11214 as consolidated (Seoul High Ct.),
in re Request for Reversing Corrective Orders on Collusion of Dongsuh Food Co., Ltd. and
Nestle Korea Inc.
06Chang-Su Choe_OK  2010.7.13 3:24 PM  페이지372   (주)anyprinting(pmac) 
competitive harm should be determined by hypothesizing conditions in
which there existed no agreement.104)
The Supreme Court of Korea found that whether the act in itself has
competitive harm should be decided on a case-by-case, relying upon all the
circumstances such as the features of products, consumer standards in
selecting products, or the effect that the act had on competition in the market
and relevant firms. The Court held that it is not acceptable for the KFTC to
control the parallel pricing by presuming the agreement of firms under Article
19(5) because it is clear that the price increases of defendants lack competitive
harm.105) In reviewing how the lower court has applied the law to the facts, it
considered market realities rather than the mere significance of combined
market shares. The Court’s reasoning is worth quoting in full:
According to the record, the domestic coffee market at that time
had a special feature that the law of supply and demand does not
apply—if the prices of coffee products increase, the corresponding
demand also increases. Coffee products have the characteristics that
product differentiation is feasible as the decision to purchase the
products depends upon consumers’ tastes, the products’ smell, or the
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104) Judgment of March 15, 2002, 99Du6514 and 99 Du6512 as consolidated (Supreme Court
of Korea), in re Collusion of Dongsuh Fool Co., Ltd. and Nestle Koera Inc. In general, the U.S.
courts do not set up a hypothetical competitive price and compare it to then-existing market
price for the purpose of finding that the market price is above the competitive level. They rather
consider such factors as industry-wide overcapacity. See, e.g., Park v. El Paso Bd. of Realtors, 764
F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1985). In antitrust cases, the “before and after” and “yardstick” damages tests
are typically employed. Under the before-and-after method, an expert ordinarily compares
profits or growth (usually by multiple regression analysis) during relevant damage periods with
profits or growth during some earlier periods. Under the yardstick method, the expert
ordinarily compares profits in some second “yardstick” market with the market subject to the
violation. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, at FN. 135.
105) The Dongsuh Court’s holding might appear to have construed the scope of competitive
harm more narrowly than ever before as it considered other circumstances than the mere
market shares of relevant parties. In the subsequent 2002 collusion case of four sanitary paper
manufacturers, however, the Supreme Court of Korean has reverted back to the broad reading
of competitive harm in line with the definition under Article 2. The Court has found that as long
as “defendants’ act of maintaining uniform prices in concert may impact or threaten to impact
the determination of prices, it constitutes a substantially limiting effect on competition.” See in re
Collusion of Four Sanitary Paper Manufacturing Companies, Judgement of Feb. 28, 2003,
2001Du1239 (Supreme Court of Korea).
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good will of brand names rather than prices. By aligning with their
marketing strategies the above special features of the market and
products, defendants have competitively increased the prices of their
products in order to lead consumers into perceiving that their products
are high quality ones. Also the market shares of defendants have
immediately changed. For those reasons, the price increases of
defendants clearly reflect price competition between competitors in the
market under the extraordinary condition of then-domestic coffee
market where if the product price of one company is rather lower than
that of the other competitor, the product is not sold well. It is difficult
to see that the price increase resulted in competition limiting effect in
the relevant market—then-domestic market.
For purposes of comparison, in Brooke Group Ltd., v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court had employed the similar reasoning.106)
When plaintiff was required to establish a competitive injury, the Court held
that:
[E]ven in a concentrated market, the occurrence of a price increase
does not in itself permit a rational inference of conscious parallelism or
supracompetitive pricing. Where, as here, output is expanding at the
same time prices are increasing, rising prices are equally consistent
with growing product demand. Under these conditions, a jury may not
infer competitive injury from price and output data absent some
evidence that tends to prove that output was restricted or prices were
above a competitive level.
What the Korean and the U.S. Supreme Courts in Dongsuh and in Brooke
Group Ltd. respectively intended to find seems clear: if the nature of the
market does not operate under the fundamental economic law of supply and
demand as some variable comes into play (such as tastes or brand values of
374 |   Journal of Korean Law Vol. 9: 343
106) This case is not a collusion case. See Brooke Group Ltd., v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 237 (1993) (finding that that “competitor’s alleged below-cost sales
of generic cigarettes through discriminatory volume rebates did not create a competitive injury
in violation of Robinson-Patman Act.”).
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coffee products in the Dongsuh case), competitive harm may not be presumed
but should be actually shown. In this regard, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Brooke Group Ltd. clarified that either actual output restriction or
supracompetitive pricing can establish competitive harm.107)
As a technical matter of Korean antitrust practice, the threshold market
share that can pass muster under Article 19(5) seems low.108) In the four
sanitary paper case, The Supreme Court of Korea has affirmed Seoul High
Court’s finding that the 29.3 percent market share of the two defendants
among the four defendants are insufficient to be deemed to have competitive
harm.109) In a later 2002 KFTC decision, the KFTC held that the 32.6 percent
market share of all collusion participants should be enough to possess a
market power and thus competitive harm.110) It remains to be seen what
percent of combined market shares of defendants would be deemed not to
have a competitive harm for Article 19(5) purposes.
2. The U.S. Antitrust Practice
As discussed above, the U.S. antitrust finds price-fixing to be illegal per se
and does not require actual proof of its harmful effect on competition. The far-
reaching breadth of the per se rule under the Sherman Act is shown as the
U.S. Supreme Court has found that:111)
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107) See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1978).
108) Judgment 2000-85 of May 31, 2000, 9911GongDong1657 (Korea Fair Trade Commission),
in re Collusion of Four Mobile Communication Enterprisers (finding the 57 percent market shares
of parties sufficient even though one remaining leading company has the 43 percent market
share); in re Reconsideration Request of Three Color Steel Sheet Manufacturing Companies,
supra note 21 (holding that the combined market shares of 46.3 percent are not that low percent to
keep plaintiff from establishing the existence of a market controlling power); in re Reconsideration
Request of DaeHan Cast-Iron Product Manufacturing Corp. and LightTech Industry Corp., Re-
decision 98-39 of Nov. 6. 1998 9809SimYi1400 (finding that the allegedly low combined market
shares of 40-45 percent in the relevant market do not preclude the presence of competitive
harm).
109) See in re Collusion of Four Sanitary Paper Manufacturing Companies, Judgment 
of May 28, 2002, 2000Du1386; see also Judgment of Apr. 18, 2002, 2001Nu2579 (Seoul High Ct.), in
re Request for Reversing Corrective Orders on Collusion of Four Installment Financing
Companies. 
110) See Judgment 2002-225 of Oct. 31, 2002, 2002DokGoan1057 (Korea Fair Trade
Commission), in re Collusion of LG-Caltex Corp. and SK Gas Corp.
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It makes no difference whether the motives of the participants are
good or evil; whether the price fixing is accomplished by express
contract or by some more subtle means; whether the participants
possess market control; whether the amount of interstate commerce
affected is large or small; or whether the effect of the agreement is to
raise or to decrease prices.
In the U.S. antitrust jurisprudence, unreasonably restricting effect on
competition is necessary to determine as a preliminary matter whether a
particular arrangement constitutes clearly harmful price-fixing and therefore
should be found illegal in and of itself.112) In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc.,113) the U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear how to
differentiate the illegal and legal price-fixing arrangements holding that:
More generally, in characterizing … conduct under the per se rule,
our inquiry must focus on whether the effect and, here because it tends
to show effect, … the purpose of the practice are to threaten the proper
operation of our predominantly free-market economy—that is,
whether the practice facially appears to be one that would always or
almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output, and in
what portion of the market, or instead one designed to “increase
economic efficiency and render markets more, rather than less,
competitive.”       
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111) See United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc. 351 U.S. 305, 310 (1956).
112) See generally Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 34, para. 1909-1914; see id. para. 1410
Supplement and FN 10 (finding a couple of cases that have seriously considered the significance
of market shares: “M.L.C. v. North Am. Philips Corp., 671 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (Small
aggregate share makes alleged price-fixing conspiracy implausible; post-trial judgment for
defendants), and [Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Institute, 851 F.2d 478 (1st Cir. 1988)]
(No inference of conspiracy from identical prices by competitors with differing market positions
and different preferences for prices that would maximize profits, thus making collusion more
difficult.”).
113) See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20
(1979), quoting U.S. v. U.S. Gypsum Co. 438 U.S. 422, 436 n. 13, 441 n. 16 (1978); see also National
Soc. of Professional Engineers v. U.S., 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978); Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 43 U.S. 36, 50 n. 16 (1977); and Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4
(1958).
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Although the term of unreasonable restraint or competitive injury appears
in other procedural stages of the U.S. antitrust practice,114) the necessary
magnitude of proof in the U.S. collusion cases appears different from the
competitive harm under Article 19(5) of Korean antitrust. As noted, in the U.S.
antitrust, a plaintiff is required to plead that concerted action may
“unreasonably restrain interstate or foreign trade or commerce” in order to
withstand a motion to dismiss. In a price-fixing litigation context,
unreasonable restraint is not required to be proved but a mere allegation is
sufficient to jump through the first procedural bar. In this regard, Professor
Areeda adequately explains the significance of market shares finding that:115)
Although market shares are irrelevant to the per se condemnation
of a horizontal agreement fixing price, they do bear on the motive to
enter such an agreement, for competitors aggregating a minor share
would not ordinarily be able to affect market prices and thus are
unlikely to have tried to do so. When the number of cumulative shares
of the alleged price-fixers is small, they should be deemed to lack the
motive to enter the alleged agreement.
In short, a showing of competitive harm has been demanded in antirust
analysis for purposes of asking and answering whether certain pricing
arrangement can be characterized as a price-fixing without requiring full-
blown antitrust analysis. It appears that antirust authorities and courts of the
two countries commonly ask for a competitive harm in antitrust analysis to
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114) To obtain a monetary relief under §§ 4 and 4A of the Clayton Act, a Sherman Section 1
private plaintiff must show an injury in the plaintiff’s business or property as a result of the
conspiracy. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 15a. By contrast, the MRFTA do not have a specific injury
requirement for Article 19 purposes because a fine is imposed as administrative measure, but
merely actual commitment—as opposed to mere agreement—is required for a fine to be
imposed upon. The standard under the Clayton Act demands much higher burden of showing
a causal link between plaintiff’s injury and defendants’ price-fixing than Article 19(5). The
competitive injury requirement under the Clayton Act does not seem comparable to the
competitive harm under Article 19(5) of Korean antitrust. In terms of the required quantum of
evidence, it would be fair to say that the competitive harm of Article 19(5) falls between the
requirement of competitive harm for mere characterization purposes and the competitive injury
requirement of the U.S. Clayton Act Sections 4, 4A.
115) See Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 34, para. 1412 Supplement.
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consider an economic plausibility of concerted conduct from particular pricing
arrangements.116) As an initial matter, Korean antitrust generally examines the
combined market shares of colluders, barriers to entry, actual output restriction
(excess capacity), and/or supra-competitive prices in order to predict whether
the structural evidence of a particular industry shows that concerted action is
plausible in an economic sense. Once characterized as a price-fixing, a
competitive harm is provisionally assumed particularly in face of high market
shares of relevant parties among other factors.
After all, it seems clear that antitrust authorities are willing to condemn
any concerted action “to limit output and charge a higher than competitive
price.”117) As a practical matter, as Professor Areeda noted “varying
perceptions about profit maximizing price levels” appear to be the most
demanding factor to be considered. Insisting on evidence of immediate and
concrete harm, in the form of a supra-competitive price or otherwise, may
challenge antitrust analysis. In practice, it is highly difficult—if not
impossible—to prove actual competitive harm by showing a supracompetitive
price, that is, whether a particular price level that allegedly resulted from
concerted conduct are indeed above the level that would have prevailed in the
absence of it.118) That is true even in the case of outright price-fixing among
competitors.119)
*                                   *                                   *
To be sure the failure to show an actual harm may keep us from having a
378 |   Journal of Korean Law Vol. 9: 343
116) See GONGJEONGGEORAEWIWONHEO GONGDONGHANGWISIMSAGIJUN [KOREA FAIR TRADE
COMMISSION, STANDARDS OF REVIEW FOR COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES] (as amended on April 9 2009),
available in English at http://eng.ftc.go.kr/. Cf. Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 34, para. 1500-
1511.1; see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY—THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE, at 249-266 (1999); STEPHEN F. ROSS, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW, at 118-27 (1992).
117) See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 95 (2nd ed. 2001) (arguing that “[s]ome degree of
tacit coordination of pricing in reaction to external shocks, such as an increase in raw-material
costs, is inevitable and unobjectionable. What is not inevitable and is objectionable is a tacit
agreement to limit output and charge a higher than competitive price.”).
118) See, e.g., J. Baker & T. Bresnahan, Empirical Methods of Identifying and Measuring Market
Power, 61 ANTITRUST L. J. 3 (1992); see also J. Kattan, Market Power in the Presence of an Installed Base,
62 ANTITRUST L. J. 1 (1993).
119) See Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 34, at para. 1421c2 (noting that “even conscious
price fixing can lack effect, as is suggested by the difficulties many plaintiffs have in proving
that they paid more than the price that would otherwise have prevailed.”).
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grip on the general shape of the antitrust gist—the effect on competition.120)
Putting too much emphasis on the harm may simply lead us to elude relevant
points at issue, however, by making us out of step with the whole evidence’s
probative value other than actual competitive harm. More to the point, the
difficulty can hardly be used as a reason for denying the weight of competitive
harm because as Judge Posner put, “conjecture has its place in building a case
out of circumstantial evidence.”121)
IV. Discussion
As a matter of antitrust laws, there are almost no differences between the
substantive laws of Korea and the U.S. antitrust in that concerted conduct is
broadly construed in its scope and extent. The different approach appears to
lie in the operation of procedural devices. Korean antitrust possesses the
unique provision of Article 19(5), which has the function to shift the burden of
proof between the parties similar to the U.S. motion for summary judgment
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In fact, the U.S. antitrust seems to
have strict standards for proof of concerted conduct. If the plaintiff does not
meet the standard, a court may simply dismiss the parallel pricing case.
Of importance to Korean antitrust is that the presumption clause Article
19(5) is intertwined and interacts with its competitive harm requirement. The
clause is dangerous in practicality, however, To the extent that it is used to
require defendants to bear the burden of disproving the alleged presence of
concerted action, it may adversely affect defendants. Another way to offset the
over-deterrence danger of the clause in finding defendants liable under
ambiguous circumstances should take seriously the magnitude of competitive
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120) Professor Hovenkamp finds that “the Chicago theory that market power is a relative
rarity has given way to numerous econometric procedures for measuring market power with
greater precision than we have had in the past. These procedures indicate that significant
market power is not all that rare, even in markets that do not have dominant firms.”
Econometric analysis generally applies statistical and mathematical methods in economics to
describe the numerical relationships between key economic forces. See HOVENKAMP, supra note
116, at 64.
121) See in re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation, 295 F.3d, at 660.
06Chang-Su Choe_OK  2010.7.13 3:24 PM  페이지379   (주)anyprinting(pmac) 
harm in parallel pricing cases at hand. Together with the procedural device,
therefore, adequate use of the competition harm requirement should have the
significant function for Article 19(5) purposes.
As the development of Korean antirust practice showed, the gradually
careful use of the competitive harm prerequisite under the Article 19(5) has
reduced the potential danger of over-deterrence or over-enforcement that the
clause may convey. Although Korean antitrust tribunals had been focused on
the market shares of relevant parties in measuring competitive harm, Korean
Supreme Court in Dongsuh and recent courts considered other market
circumstances that may make it easier for competitors to coordinate price
increases.122) In the mean time, more knowledgeable antitrust analysis has
allowed the KFTC to find and advance several ways of establishing the
required competitive harm, for example, by showing barriers to entry or excess
capacity in addition to the mere market shares of the alleged conspirators.123)
Nonetheless, a consistent, cautious approach continues to be necessary as
long as the presumption clause remains to stand out in Korean antitrust. In
general, at the heart of Korean antirust practice for collusive parallel pricing is
the extent to which the competitive harm requirement and the procedural
instrument affect relevant parties in a way that shifts a higher or lower burden
of showing concerted conduct. In practice, the outcome of parallel pricing
cases should be contingent upon how the presence and magnitude of
competitive harm can be technically adjusted in any given fact pattern, and
due consideration should be taken into as for defendants’ rational and
legitimate reasons or explanations of parallel pricing.
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122) See, e.g., Judgment 2004-255 of August 31, 2004, 2004GongDong0998 (Korea Fair Trade
Commission), in re Collusion of Thirteen Corrugated Cardboard Manufacturing Companies; See
Judgment 2002-225 of Oct. 31, 2002, 2002DokGoan1057 (Korea Fair Trade Commission), in re
Collusion of LG-Caltex Corp. and SK Gas Corp; in re Request for Reversing Corrective Orders
on Collusion of Four Credit Card Companies, supra note 46.
123) See KOREA FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, STANDARDS OF REVIEW FOR COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES,
supra note 116.
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